I. Analysis

The illegal ivory trade takes place on a vast global market, moving across thousands of miles and exchanging thousands of hands. It forms a global network from Central Africa to East Asia. The efforts  to end the slaughter and exploitation of African elephants for ivory creates a second network that competes  with the illegal ivory trade network. However, where the ivory trade is bound by strong links between the nodes within the network, the NGOs and government agencies fighting the trade find themselves competing not only against the ivory trade, but with one another.

The illicit nature of the ivory trade is underscored by the strong cultural and social bonds, which drive it. Manuel Castells (2009) describes, where cultures linked in network society are heterogenous, “the common culture of the global network society is a culture of protocols of communication enabling communication between different cultures on the basis not of shared values but of the shared value of communication” (p. 38). The demand for ivory varies from culture to culture, but the demand itself is what binds the network together. Bryan Christy’s (2012) investigative report on the ivory trade noted several expressions of the communications value in the ivory trade, including the tricks Filipino smugglers use to hide their illegal ivory and how to craft ivory to make it more easily smuggled (“Ivory”). Rather than being driven by cultural values themselves, the ivory trade network’s nodes are connected by the communication of those values, which in turn perpetuate the values themselves.

Finding a way to penetrate the ivory trade’s network must begin with an examination of both relationships within the trade and current efforts to curb the trade. Amelia Arsenault (2011) puts forth a theory of network analysis, where networks are understood through the relationships between nodes of a network rather than the nodes themselves (p. 14). The structure of the network is determined by the relationships between nodes and the constraints on relationships therein. Arsenault also draws upon Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s “netwars” to highlight the necessity of approaching a rival network with network-based tactics rather than a hierarchal strategy (p. 15). Based on Arsenault’s posits, the NGOs and government programs fighting the ivory trade must target the lines of communication binding the nodes of the network together, namely the shared value of ivory.

 

II. Recommendations

The NGOs described above all have the same goal: to stop the poaching of elephants and end the trade of ivory. However, the means to which these organizations reach these ends varies between them. The WWF focuses on government outreach while the WCN promotes partnerships between donors and conservationists, and the AWF obviously centers its efforts in Africa.  The base values shared between them bind them as a network, but the methods in which they communicate those values keep the structure of their network weak and even puts them in competition with one another. The wide array of organizations battling elephant poaching face a network where the underlying values and communication of values is deeply engrained. By focusing their efforts and expanding the ties of communication between one another, the NGOs will be better equipped to disrupt the ivory trade’s network.

Additionally, NGOs and state governments must be willing and able to exploit the so-called “CNN Effect” (Hanson, 2008, p. 102). The media’s ability to broadcast information and even help to reshape values across networks cannot be underestimated. The “CNN Effect” describes the reaction of state governments to media coverage of an event that is otherwise not addressed by the state, at least in terms of visible coverage. While Elizabeth Hanson points out that the “CNN Effect” is “too easy to knock down” (p. 108) and lacks substantive evidence to prove as a sure course of action, the most recent coverage on elephant poaching in the media, as demonstrated by articles in National Geographic, the New York Times and other mainstream media outlets, appeared not long before the U.S. State Department announced initiatives to fight the ivory trade, as cited above.

The correlation may not constitute a “CNN effect,” but it does raise an interesting parallel between media coverage and policy implementation. According to Castells (2009), power and network-power especially depends on “the ability to constitute networks” and “the ability to connect and ensure the cooperation of different networks by sharing common goals and resources” (p. 45). In this case, the power to fight the proliferation of ivory and elephant poaching comes from the capability of the network of government agencies and NGOs to use the media to reshape the underlying values of the network. Governments must use the established networks of the media to augment their own in this fight.

One way in particular to exploit the media in this regard is to employ well-known media figures to fight on the behalf of the cause. Castells (2009) cites celebrities and entertainment media as a viable venue for the application of network power given the gross consumption of entertainment media by the general public (p. 328). For the anti-poaching network, one of the most high-profile figures to join their cause is Yao Ming, the Chinese basketball player. Ming traveled to Kenya as a WildAid ambassador, touring the country and blogging about the impact of wildlife poaching (http://yaomingblog.com/). Ming’s involvement is significant because of the large role China plays in the ivory trade, currently standing as the world’s foremost consumer of illegal ivory. As one of China’s biggest celebrities and a global celebrity in his own right, Ming is in a unique position to influence the formation of values given his celebrity is a product of those values.

The great demand for ivory in China is a facet that may be under-appreciated by U.S. foreign policy-makers. While the State Department generates considerable amounts of media to educate against the purchase of ivory, it is limited in its scope as it tries to speak to a foreign audience, the Chinese people, whose access to global media is tightly controlled by the state government, namely the Chinese Communist Party. Additionally, as Christy (2012) found in his investigation of the ivory trade, corruption is a key contributor to the perpetuation of the network, especially in China where an investigation by the Environmental Investigation Agency found “up to 90 percent of the ivory on the Chinese market was illegal” (“Ivory”). The media control and corruption which characterize the Chinese state require more direct engagement by the U.S. government to influence institutional attitudes. Obviously, U.S.-China relations are more complicated than the issue of wildlife poaching, but the principles of public diplomacy can still be applied to an issue of moral and ethical concern rather than national interest.

Nye (2008) states the three dimensions of public diplomacy include daily communication, strategic communication, and building long lasting relationships between key actors (pp. 101-102). The third dimension is of particular importance as it emphasizes the relationship between elites in both the US and China whereby the State Department can directly influence Chinese policy-makers to transform their attitudes regarding the ivory trade. While Nye (2008) admits this dimension of public diplomacy will not necessarily yield short-term results (p. 105), direct government engagement drives the greater campaign to influence a state’s stance on policy. By penetrating the media networks with its anti-poaching message using both media networks to boost the message and direct engagement to build long-term diplomatic relationships, NGOs and state governments could experience greater, faster success in altering the communications values which drive the demand for ivory across media networks and lines of diplomacy.

The anti-poaching network might also find a strong role model in the similarly intentioned climate change movement. Castells (2009) uses the environmentalist movement as a case study for network power and its ability to reshape values in society (p. 303-304). He also cites individual campaigns such as the Earth Hour (p. 332), polls marking the rising awareness of global warming in the United States from 41% in 1982 to 91% in 2006 (p. 309), and even Al Gore’s unconventional but nonetheless effective celebrity (p. 329) in propagating the environmental agenda. The plethora of organizations, campaigns and efforts to raise awareness in the public mind of the threat posed by climate change reshaped the public’s attitudes towards the issue where policy-makers would be forced to acknowledge the issue and act upon it. The anti-ivory effort must adopt this all-encompassing communications strategy in order to alter the structure and basis of the networks supporting the ivory trade. Just as Castells says, “we had to reprogram the networks of our minds by reprogramming the networks of our communications environment” (p. 339).